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Abstract

At the end of the American Civil War, political divisiveness, economic turmoil,
and violence plagued the South. Riots occurred across the Reconstruction South, from
New Orleans to Memphis. Though scholars have examined the causes of Reconstruction
violence, this study examines the role of newspapers in promulgating fear, paranoia, and
violence in Southern communities in the wake of the New Orleans Riot of 1866. This
thesis analyzes nine Louisiana newspapers to investigate whether newspapers published
local and national rumors of violence or potential uprisings in the first three months after
the riot. Though the rise of telegraphic news aided the rapid spread of information, it also
enabled the pervasive circulation of rumors, gossip, and paranoia. Conservative
newspapers often offered stories of mob activity, chaotic insurrections, and senseless
violence, occurring within the state and in other regions of the South. The menace of
Radical Republicanism appeared real to conservative editors, and publishing elaborate
radical conspiracies, distorting the number of fatalities, and spreading rumors of
instability seemed viable outlets for changing public opinion in favor of the Democratic
Party.

Key words: Reconstruction, Radical Republicanism, Louisiana, New Orleans Riot of
1866
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I. Introduction
The New Orleans Riot of 1866 and the Reconstruction South
On July 30, 1866, white and black Louisianans gathered at the Mechanics’
Institute in downtown New Orleans to attend the state’s constitutional convention, which
convened to discuss the contentious issue of extending suffrage to black men. While
many Republicans supported the movement for black suffrage, white Democrats opposed
granting black men the vote, insisting that “the loyal voters of the south are not yet
prepared for political equality of the negro with the white man.” 1 The convention drew a
large crowd of both Republicans and Democrats eager to hear the outcome of the
convention. Shortly after noon, a procession of 100 to 150 black people marched through
the streets of New Orleans toward the Institute, excited about the possibility of universal
suffrage. However, when words were exchanged between members of the procession, the
police, and a nearby crowd of militant whites, the march turned deadly. A young white
boy had begun taunting the black men, crying “Damned sons of bitches!” 2 As the black
men advanced toward the young boy, one of the police officers who had been surveying
the scene from the corner of Canal and Dryades rushed to take the boy from the hostile
confrontation. Then, the first shot rang through the crowd as one of the black men had
pulled out his revolver and fired, sending the convention into a state of chaos. The whites
on Canal “rushed up the street toward the institute,” and the black men of the procession
retaliated, shouting insults and throwing bricks. 3 Some white men carried bloody slug
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shots and boasted of their murderous street battle victories. 4 The city policemen, who had
quickly lost control of the scene, joined in the violence and attacked the Institute, firing
indiscriminately upon those inside the main hall. Though blacks and whites attempted to
defend themselves, the results of the riot were catastrophic. The day after the riot, the
front page headline of the New Orleans Daily Crescent declared the massacre “A Terrible
Day” for New Orleanians, and the official report of the riot affirms these sentiments. 5
The report lists 38 casualties and 146 wounded in the riot, with black participants
suffering disproportionately from the massacre. Thirty-four of the 38 killed were black,
as were 119 of the 146 wounded. 6
At the end of the American Civil War, political divisiveness, economic turmoil,
and violence plagued the South. Michael Perman’s Reunion without Compromise: The
South and Reconstruction, 1865-1868 shows that discord existed across the nation as the
South reentered the Union. Federal troops occupied the South, and Confederate armies
were disbanded. White southerners could no longer rely on slave labor for economic
support, and the South’s agriculture suffered for the new expenses of waged
employment. 7 After formally surrendering their political power over the South and losing
the backbone of their economy to emancipation, white southerners feared they had lost
their autonomy, and they were subject to the will of the North. Reconciliation between
the North and the South was difficult to accomplish, especially as the question of
universal black suffrage loomed in the air. 8 In the summer and fall of 1865, southern
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politicians waited expectantly for President Andrew Johnson to release his plans for
restoring the South to the Union. Despite their recent defeat, white southerners
maintained their defiance to Northern rule and staunchly opposed black enfranchisement.
They warned that economic disorder and anarchy would occur if the North did not
administrate the process of reunification with care and consideration of the South’s
demands. 9
Though the New Orleans Massacre was not the first race riot to occur in the
former Confederate states, it is notable for its political origins. Social and economic
disturbances were familiar to the South prior to Reconstruction, but the New Orleans
Massacre marked a transitional event, one where outbreaks of violence began to be based
primarily on political grievances. 10 Many historians, such as James G. Hollandsworth,
George C. Rable, and Gilles Vandal have examined the causes and events of the New
Orleans Massacre, but few scholars have attempted to uncover how large-scale political
violence affected Southern communities.
Recent historical scholarship has viewed the New Orleans Riot as an attempt of
white southerners to disenfranchise and terrorize blacks during the early years of
Reconstruction. In An Absolute Massacre: The New Orleans Race Riot of July 30, 1866,
Hollandsworth provides a detailed narrative of the race riot, but he also analyzes the
political and racial motives that compelled white southerners to retaliate against the
supporters of the convention. Hollandsworth viewed the riot as a critical factor in
establishing the “Solid South,” where white conservatives held the highest social status

9

Perman, 34-35.
George C. Rable, But There Was No Peace: The Role of Violence in the Politics of Reconstruction
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1984), 43.

10

3

and blacks remained marginalized in their communities for years after slavery had been
abolished. 11 Historian James K. Hogue compared the riot to a type of “uncivil war,”
where vigilantes, paramilitaries, and white supremacist militias in Louisiana used
counterrevolutionary measures against the growing threat of black enfranchisement and a
new egalitarian racial order. The riot was not an isolated event of sporadic violence, but it
was a reaction to the social upheaval that accompanied the end of the war.
Previous historical scholarship has examined the ways in which white southerners
attempted to maintain economic, political, and social control over their communities after
the war had ended. George C. Rable’s But There Was No Peace: The Role of Violence in
the Politics of Reconstruction argues that conservatives in the South tried to retain white
supremacy by spreading violence and terror throughout the former Confederate states.
Rable uses several case studies of violent outbreaks from across the South to support his
claim that white southerners used violence as a counterrevolutionary instrument against
Federal Reconstruction policies. Rable’s findings have broader implications for those
studying the social history of the South during Reconstruction. In the wake of the
Confederacy’s defeat, white southerners faced the loss of their economic livelihoods,
racial dominance, and political power. Violence was one way in which white southerners
could maintain their antebellum status in the post-war years. 12
Stetson Kennedy arrives at a similar conclusion as Rable in After Appomattox:
How the South Won the War. Like Rable, Kennedy argues that white southerners
attempted to uphold the southern oligarchy of the antebellum period through violence and
terror. However, Kennedy takes a different approach to his analysis of Reconstruction

11
12

Hollandsworth, 3.
Rable, 187-89.

4

violence by comparing the social and racial inequalities that existed among the Old and
New South. He concludes that the end of the Civil War did not result in immediate
improvements in the political and social status of African Americans. Blacks were still
subject to mob violence, lacked fair political representation, and found that they lacked
many of the freedoms that a Union victory had promised. 13 In the case of the New
Orleans Riot, Louisianans who attempted to establish black male suffrage in the state
were met with utter resistance from white conservatives, who retaliated against the
changing status quo by sparking the mob violence of the New Orleans Riot.
The Nineteenth-Century American Press
The New Orleans Massacre received both local and national attention, and the
way in which newspapers interpreted the details of the riot, aftershocks of violence, and
reports of social instability reveals how the public might have perceived the massacre in
its aftermath. To appreciate the role of newspapers in spreading rumors of violence from
one southern town to another, it is important to understand how news circulated among
communities in the mid-nineteenth century, as well as how political biases operated in the
press. The nineteenth-century was a period of rapid industrial and technological growth
in the United States that marked the beginning of national news wire services. Menahem
Blondheim’s News over the Wires: The Telegraph and the Flow of Public Information in
America, 1844-1897 describes how the invention of the telegraph contributed to a
centralized network of news gathering and distribution across the United States. 14 Her
most important conclusion, that the centralization of news networks integrated American
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society across the constraints of distance, is useful in understanding how the rapid spread
of public information impacted the way communities received news of Reconstruction
violence.
With the development of the telegraph and the national news wire services,
individuals began to use the new technology to further promote their specific political
views. Mark Wahlgren Summers describes the connections between politicians and the
press in the Reconstruction Era in The Press Gang: Newspapers and Politics, 1865-1878.
According to Summers, partisan interests defined independent presses during
Reconstruction, as political coverage provided much of the news and amusement for
those of the time. 15 Recognizing the power of the party press, politicians sought to shape
public opinion by forming alliances with reporters who shared similar political interests.
The dissemination of partisan news became a viable practice for journalists,
especially with the development of party presses in the Civil War and Reconstruction
periods. Republican papers allowed Unionists to spread their platform items across the
Confederate states, even though their policies were not well received by the majority of
white Southerners. 16 The press played a powerful role in spreading political dissent and
controversial opinions to regions where they might not have otherwise been heard.
The Post-war Spread of Fear, Paranoia, and Rumors
Fear and paranoia permeated the social atmosphere of the South, aided by the
publications of party presses that spread rumors across communities. White conservatives
feared emancipation and racial equality, and they worried that blacks were prepared to
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wrest equality from whites through violent insurrections. These fears existed, and they
present challenges to historians who wish to study rumors in past societies.
In studying fear, paranoia, and rumor in historical scholarship, causality can be
difficult to establish, and there is not always an overt link between a report of an
insurrection and how seriously the community feared these reports. Despite these
challenges, studying fear is not a hopeless endeavor, and several historians have provided
useful frameworks for considering how to interpret rumors among primary sources. Mark
Wahlgren Summers’s A Dangerous Stir: Fear, Paranoia, and the Making of
Reconstruction examined newspaper reports of rumors and political cartoons to
understand how paranoia shaped public political sentiment toward Federal
Reconstruction. 17 Rather than using rumor as evidence for events that may or may not
have occurred, Summers uses rumor as a tool for interpreting the social atmosphere of the
Reconstruction South. Summers’s work shows that no matter the motive behind reporting
a rumor or perpetuating misinformation, those who spread such speculations had the
potential to generate substantial fear in their communities.
The “Christmas insurrection scare of 1865” demonstrates the ways in which
rumors circulated across the South in the post-Civil War period. During the Christmas
season following the end of the war, both black and white southerners believed that the
Federal government would institute a major process of land redistribution, allocating
former slaveholders’ land to their newly freed slaves. According to historian Steven
Hahn, white Southerners feared that blacks would initiate a violent Christmas uprising if
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they did not receive the land they believed would be given to them. 18 The spread of these
rumors show the economic uncertainty that existed in the Reconstruction South, and they
also reveal how blacks and whites used rumor to contend for control over local areas in
their communities.
Hahn provides a valuable framework for studying rumors and fears in the
Reconstruction South, one based upon the work of political scientist James C. Scott. In
Domination and the Arts of Resistance, Scott studies the furtive political conduct of
subordinate groups, such as the behaviors of slaves in the antebellum United States. 19 He
argues that the powerless of society create “hidden transcripts” to critique the dominant
groups who hold power in society. These hidden transcripts can be expressed as rumors,
gossip, folktales, songs, gestures, and jokes, among others. Scott argues that the hidden
transcripts of subordinate groups provided a secretive framework within which the
powerless could resist the authority of the empowered. 20 The slaves of antebellum
society, as well as the freed blacks of the Reconstruction Era, could use hidden
transcripts, such as rumor and gossip, to fight covertly for power in their communities.
The white conservatives of Louisiana did the same in the aftermath of the New Orleans
Riot, but their transcripts did not need to be hidden. Rather, they were published for
public consumption in the daily papers.
This study will use the work of Summers, Hahn, and Scott as a guide for
investigating rumors in historical study. Rather than viewing the rumors published in
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newspapers after the New Orleans Riot as factual evidence for events that occurred, this
study will examine them as “hidden transcripts,” or ways in which one social group
critiques the authority of another social group. In this particular study, the social groups
who critique and the social groups who are critiqued will vary depending on the bias and
intentions of the newspaper that published the rumor.
The goal of this study is not to examine the motivations behind and the events of
the New Orleans Riot of 1866; such topics have already been covered in length by
previous Reconstruction scholars. Rather, this study uncovers how the riot and the
Louisiana press affected the social atmosphere of New Orleans in its aftermath. Reports
of insurrections or rumors of violence persisted in the city for months after the riot
occurred and even spread across the state. By publishing such reports, newspapers
contributed to the heightened level of social instability that existed in the wake of major
Reconstruction riots. By building upon previous historical scholarship and using unique
frameworks for analyzing rumor and fear, this research adds to a broader social history of
the South during Reconstruction.

9

II. The Bloody Details
In the aftermath of the riot, many Louisiana papers attempted to discern the events
of the massacre and calculate the total number killed and wounded in the affair. The
Shreveport South-western reported, “None regret the bloody details of yesterday more
than we do – it was horrifying; but there seemed no alternative; fanaticism ruled for the
day.” 21 The “bloody details” of the New Orleans Massacre were staggering. The
congressional record of the riot later listed 38 casualties and 146 wounded, but many
Louisianans were uncertain of how many were killed or injured until that report was
released in January of 1867. 22 In the absence of a definitive answer regarding the human
cost of the clash, rumors abounded as to how many individuals lost their lives on the
streets of New Orleans that fateful day. As they speculated about the bloody details of the
riot, newspapers were able to shape public perception of the affray.
Uncertain of the actual number of fatalities, Louisiana papers circulated various
estimates of the number killed in the New Orleans Riot, ranging from “two whites and
several negroes” to around sixty. 23 The count rose and fell as papers gleaned additional
information over the wires. The July 31 issue of the Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly Gazette &
Comet declared that “upwards of fifteen persons” had been reported killed. Revealing the
ongoing flux in the casualty figures, the Comet’s next issue printed an article published
previously in the New Orleans Daily Crescent, stating that “so far as we have been
informed, about thirty negroes were killed and several white persons were dangerously
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wounded.” 24 Newspapers played a crucial role in conveying the violent extent of the New
Orleans Massacre, despite not knowing the true magnitude of the riot themselves. Editors
relied on telegraphic news from nearby cities, and the estimates of those killed varied
considerably. For instance, the South-western published several telegrams in its August 1
issue. While one telegram from Jackson reported that “the number of killed is estimated
at 60 – all negroes,” a separate count from New Orleans painted a different picture. The
New Orleans dispatch declared, “The casualties sum up; thirty negroes killed, and several
whites, including a number of policemen, dangerously wounded.” 25 The South-western
resorted to publishing both conflicting reports, though readers could not be certain which
report was true.
Desperate to find some source of information about the riot, newspapers turned to
one another to figure out how many lives were lost at the Mechanics’ Institute.
Telegraphic news reported in the South-western was able to spread to other Louisiana
papers as well, revealing the far reach of the rumors. The same telegrams reported in the
August 1 issue of the South-western were published in August 4 issues of both the SemiWeekly Natchitoches Times and the Bellevue Bossier Banner. The Times and the Banner
published the South-western’s article verbatim, but the Times’ piece featured the bold,
incendiary headline, “Riot in New Orleans!! 60 Negroes Killed!” 26 For the editors of the
Times, the exaggerated count undoubtedly made for a more eye-catching headline, even if
their article subsequently admitted that the casualty figures fell closer to thirty than sixty.
Throughout August, papers continued to report rumors of the number killed and
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wounded in the riot. However, the estimates of the fatalities declined dramatically from
the South-western’s initial count of “60 – all negroes.” 27 On August 8, the Semi-Weekly
Natchitoches Times stated, “It is impossible yet to arrive at the exact number of casualties
of the riot on Monday. Twenty-two deaths black and white, are all we can sum up. There
were many wounded, and death may be the consequence in many of these cases.” 28
While acknowledging the impossibility of determining the actual casualty figures, the
Times’ reported fatalities dwindled even further from the truth, demonstrating the
instability of reports that circulated on the numbers of those killed and wounded.
Over two weeks after the New Orleans Riot occurred, the Semi-Weekly
Natchitoches Times continued to waver in its reports of fatalities resulting from the
massacre. The Times’ numbers shifted again, this time escalating to an almost accurate
count of forty casualties. On August 15, the Times featured a piece titled, “The
Responsibility,” which purported that the riot “originated by two colored men of the mob
firing on the police, and the rioters endeavoring to prevent the arrest of their comrades.” 29
The Times, proposing that the rioters were prepared for such an occasion, also claimed
that their actions resulted in “the killing of forty men, and wounding of about one
hundred and sixty.” While placing the casualties in the context of their own political
leanings, the editors of the Times noted, “Among the number of killed, there was one
policeman and a citizen; and among the wounded forty one policemen, and five
citizens.” 30 Their account pays special attention to the policeman and citizens killed in
the riot, depicting them as victims of the rioters’ brutal actions. However, it glazes over
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the overwhelming loss of life that affected the black population. In actuality, thirty-four
of the 38 killed were black, as were a majority of the wounded. 31
In the same August 15 issue, the Times printed a statement issued by Lieutenant
Governor Albert Voorhies, Attorney General A.S. Herron, and New Orleans Mayor John
T. Monroe that outlined their views of the riot and provided yet another estimate of the
casualties. Notably, the numbers of those killed and wounded were presented in a
different manner than in the previous piece. The men contended that “forty-two
policemen and several citizens were either killed or wounded by them [the rioters]” and
“twenty-seven rioters were killed and a considerable number wounded.” 32 By combining
the numbers of the killed and wounded policemen and citizens, Voorhies, Herron, and
Monroe made the non-rioters appear as the real victims of the New Orleans Massacre, the
ones who suffered considerable loss of life. Their estimates also undercount the true
casualty figures for the black population. The men’s ambiguous wording and erroneous
approximations left room for a range of misguided interpretations as to what actually
occurred at the New Orleans Riot.
When conservative papers like the Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times reported the
deaths of African Americans, who were seen as the conspirators of the riot, they were
often minimized in comparison to the deaths of white policemen. On the day after the
New Orleans Massacre, the New Orleans Bee reported, “Twenty-two policemen were
wounded, of whom we obtained the following names: Theard, McDonnelly, Hennessy
and Sokoloski. The two latter are not expected to live. Police officer Waggaman is dead.
Corpl. Barnell, police officer, is also dead. We could not learn the total casualties among
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the negroes, but we can safely say there was not less than 25 killed outright. Four dray
loads were carried off from the Mechanics’ Institute.” 33 The Bee identifies the names of
the officers who were wounded and killed in the affray, but they describe the deaths of
the black population in terms of how many carts it took to move the bodies.
Like the New Orleans Bee, the South-western and the Bossier Banner devoted
more consideration to identifying the white policemen and citizens who were harmed
than identifying the blacks who were wounded and killed in the riot. On August 8, the
South-western published an account of the riot that had originally appeared in the TimesPicayune of New Orleans. The article reveals the different attentions that were accorded
to the white and black peoples involved in the massacre. It reads:
In our present report we will not endeavor to give a list of the names of the
negroes who were wounded or arrested. At the first district there were upwards of
one hundred and fifty or two hundred taken. At the second district station fiftythree were received. Three died after being brought to the station, and three others
are supposed to be mortally wounded. In all, I suppose there has been about fifty
negroes killed…Officer Sokoloski, a well-known and faithful officer, received a
ball in the groin, and is not expected to recover. Officer James Henry is also said
to be mortally wounded…A son of Dr. Cenas, a medical student…received a shot
in the neck from one of the windows in the Hall, and expired immediately. He had
nothing to do with the battle then raging. 34
The number of black casualties is once again erroneous, but the more striking
aspect of the report is the disparate treatment of the killed, wounded, and arrested among
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the races. The paper does not attempt to identify any blacks who lost their lives in the
riot, opting instead to describe them only in terms of their sheer number. However, the
piece does provide an extensive list of the whites who were killed, wounded, and
arrested. The account identifies the officers by name, and even the innocent bystander is
recognized as “a son of Dr. Cenas, a medical student.” 35 A few days later, the Bossier
Banner reprinted the article from the South-western, revealing how other papers received
and transmitted these supposed facts of the New Orleans Massacre.
The Alexandria Louisiana Democrat also spread rough estimations of the casualty
figures that did not adequately or accurately capture the true extent of the violence. The
August 8 issue of the Democrat offered “such particulars of the affair as our corps of
reporters was able to glean” and provided a more dramatic account of the massacre.
Though the article had acknowledged that the riot was “attended by more loss of life and
maiming of body than any similar occurrence in this history of New Orleans,” it could
only ascertain that “over twenty dead men lay in the street about 3 o’clock when we left
this calamity.” 36 The Democrat did not mention the casualty figures again until a month
later, when they provided a brief update of the fatality count. Publishing a succinct
summary of the official report from the military authorities of New Orleans, the
Democrat stated only that there were “38 killed, 48 severely wounded, and 98 slightly
wounded.” Though this was more accurate than the Democrat’s past report, their
numbers still failed to recognize the impact of the riot on the black population. As in the
case of the Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times, the ambiguity allowed room for various
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interpretations of the New Orleans Riot, and papers possessed the power to report the
fatalities in a way that suited their political framework.
Some conservative papers, like the New Orleans Daily Crescent, realized that
blacks had borne the brunt of the violence. Still, they framed the reports of those killed
and wounded in ways that portrayed blacks as utterly inferior to whites. On July 31, the
paper published a piece titled, “A Terrible Day,” mourning the riot’s overwhelming
casualties while interjecting their social commentary. The Crescent declared, “Some
twenty or thirty negroes were killed in this encounter. The universal expression of
sentiment was that of regret that the poor negro, who was incited to demonstrations of
violence, was the victim of the contest, while the white man, who had inflamed him,
escaped. Nevertheless, a few of those who seemed to love incendiarism, met their fate.” 37
After presenting a brief glimpse of the casualties among the blacks who had been present
at the Convention, the Crescent added their own political twist to the massacre. In their
version of the events, the riot began when “white men, standing on the steps of the State
House, exhorted the negroes to kill every white person – man, woman or child – who
interfered with them.” 38 As soon as the day after the riot, Louisiana papers like the
Crescent recognized that blacks were the ones who ultimately suffered in the massacre.
However, the paper’s portrayal of blacks as those who helplessly succumbed to the
urgings of white leaders and wrought chaos upon the city reveals the way in which they
perceived the disparity in power among the races. From the Crescent’s perspective, the
blacks were powerless to the whims of white citizens, and if incited, would risk their own
lives to commit radical acts of violence.
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Like the Crescent, the West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter used its reports of the
numbers killed and wounded to depict the black victims as inferior and powerless.
Declaring that its readers “must be in possession of all the particulars of the great riot in
New Orleans on Monday last,” the Planter refrained from publishing a report on the riot
or providing an exact count of the number they believed to be killed or wounded. Rather,
its editors offered a sentiment comparable to the one made by the Crescent, stating, “For
the negroes who fell victims to the wiles of the Conventionists, we have but one feeling
which is shared, in by a large majority of our friends – and that is sorrow. We saw several
killed during the riot, but not until the command to surrender had been repeatedly given.
Poor, deluded people! They were made to suffer for the sins of those who pretended to be
their friends…” 39 The Planter’s account portrayed the blacks who lost their lives as
victims of their own delusions who suffered because of their weak-willed nature.
In the days and weeks after the New Orleans Massacre, Louisiana newspapers
were vital sources of intelligence for those seeking to understand the particulars of the
riot. However, information varied considerably among the papers, and the rapid spread of
speculative casualty figures shows the uncertainty that characterized the state in the riot’s
aftermath. No matter which paper they read, Louisianans were unable to determine the
true scope of the massacre. An unfortunate consequence of such speculative reporting
was that the blacks who lost their lives at the Mechanics’ Institute were often described
as nameless casualties, their deaths serving as political fodder for shaping public
perception of the New Orleans Riot. For many conservative papers, their deaths were
“bloody details,” and nothing more.

39

Sugar Planter, August 4, 1866.

17

III. “Excitement Should Be Avoided”: Rumors of Riots, Violence, and Insurrections
Rumors of Violence within New Orleans
Police records published in the New Orleans Daily Crescent reveal the heightened
levels of fear, paranoia, and violence across the city in the wake of the riot. A front-page
column in the August 2 issue of the Crescent contains several rumors of uprisings within
the city, including an allegation that “a large number of negroes from the west side of the
river had crossed below the Third District, and were crossing to attack the white
population.” 40 A different rumor led to the arrest of Boyd Robinson, who was charged
with “inciting negroes on the levee to attack white persons.” 41 The same piece warned of
another riot, this one reported by an officer, Lieutenant William H. Manning. Manning
telegraphed the Chief of Police there was “every expectation of a riot on Main street,
between Royal and Bourbon streets” that evening. 42
The rumored insurrections fizzled. The Second District police reported that the
rumor that blacks were attempting to attack the whites was “officially found to be
untrue.” 43 Robinson was brought before the District’s recorder and soon discharged for
reasons that remained unclear. As to the riot on Main Street, Manning ordered his men to
guard the scene but later telegraphed the chief, “Everything quiet. No prospect of any
disturbance.” 44
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Much like the Crescent, the West Baton Rouge Parish Sugar Planter was quick to
spread rumors. The weekly paper promoted the parish’s economic development while
condemning Radical Republicanism. The Planter published two conflicting opinions on
the condition of New Orleans in their August 11 issue. In one article, the paper alleges
that, “Rumor, with her multitude of tongues, says the Convention will meet nolens volens
on the 3rd of September next, but whether the Radical Wells will have stamina enough to
carry his threat into execution remains to be seen.” 45 On the same page, the Planter offers
another story, this one from the New Orleans Times: “The rumors which fly thick and fast
through the streets, of riots and uprisings in and around New Orleans, says the Times, are
all unfounded, and the offspring of heated imagination – so we are informed by the Chief
of Police.” Without knowing the certainties of the riot, or whether or not a major
outbreak of violence might occur again, the Sugar Planter resorted to publishing rumors,
though they claimed that they understood “the true position of affairs” in New Orleans.

46

While these incidents might have been causes for authentic concern for the New
Orleans police, they reveal something else about the social atmosphere in the city at the
time. Groundless or not, paranoia still seeped through the public mind and was reflected
in the reports of local newspapers. In his book, Domination and the Arts of Resistance,
political scientist James C. Scott describes the idea that rumors thrive “in situations in
which events of vital importance to people’s interests are occurring and in which no
reliable information – or only ambiguous information – is available.” 47 By reporting
these rumors in spite of their speculative nature, the Crescent was able to spread
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politically charged news rapidly, even if such news was vague or fallacious. Truth was
not a prerequisite for publication in a Louisiana paper.
Few pieces of intelligence were relayed with absolute certainty in the Louisiana
press, but what wound up in the local papers reveals much about how journalists
perceived the social instability that existed in the wake of the riot. A report published by
the Crescent demonstrates the prevailing paranoia that blacks were preparing to launch an
attack on the local population. On the evening of August 2, a discharged United States
soldier alerted an officer of the Third District police of “a gathering of about two hundred
armed negroes assembled some two miles below the barracks.” 48 Lieutenant Joseph
Jacobs, head of the Third District police, sent a patrol to where the crowd was rumored to
have assembled to determine the veracity of the soldier’s statement. According to the
report published by the Crescent the following day, “nothing additional had been heard
from Lieut. Jacobs in relation to the matter.” 49 Though the actual presence of the
gathering was not confirmed, it still garnered attention from the local press.
At the same time that the Crescent was publishing rumors of insurrections in their
daily papers, they maintained a firm stance against those who sought to spur outbreaks of
violence. In an article titled, “Excitement Should Be Avoided,” an unknown journalist
expresses concern that “fierce instincts have been incited, dormant passions have been
aroused, latent enmities have been developed, and ancient grudges have been revived”
among local black men and women as a direct result of the New Orleans Riot. 50 The

48

New Orleans Daily Crescent, August 3, 1866.
New Orleans Daily Crescent, August 3, 1866. Lieutenant Jacobs’s full name is not found in the Crescent,
but it is retrieved from Hollandsworth’s An Absolute Massacre, 113.
50
New Orleans Daily Crescent, August 3, 1866.
49

20

article charges the “worst of [the city’s] whites” with teaching and rousing blacks to “take
an initiatory step in such a revolution as must wholly change the fundamental
organization of society, and lead through horrible crimes to the destruction of all that is
valuable in our government.” 51 The Crescent’s dramatic flair does not come as a
surprise. As Mark Wahlgren Summers notes in The Press Gang: Newspapers and
Politics, 1865-1877, Southern journalists in the Reconstruction Era often wrote with
language that was “truculent and apocalyptic,” in order to suit their partisan
perspective. 52 The writing of the Crescent falls in line with Summers’ statement. The
conservative author displays a hostile attitude toward the Radical Republicans who
incited the riot, insisting that they will be the cause of civil government’s demise. The
Crescent also cautions its readership, which one can presume included few radicals, that
insurrectionary actions of Radical Republicans presented a serious threat to the safety of
the city, its businesses, and its residents. Therefore, the “thinking and calm” citizens of
New Orleans were responsible for assuaging the agitators of public peace and stopping
the spread of evil influences within the city. 53
Despite warning for “excitement to be avoided,” the Crescent itself did little
lessen public excitement in the weeks after the New Orleans Riot. 54 The paper continued
to publish stories of street disturbances, mob activity, and indiscriminate violence against
local citizens and policemen. On August 16, the front page of the Crescent reported that
“four negro soldiers armed with muskets threatened to kill Mr. Palegau,” who was the
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owner of a grocery store on the corner of Derbigny and Conti Street, a few blocks from
the Mechanics’ Institute, where the New Orleans Massacre had occurred almost four
weeks before. Palegau was not the only one purported to be in harm’s way. The
unidentified soldiers stood in front of his store, “threaten[ing] the lives of officer Cook
and several private citizens, present.” 55 Shots were not fired, and the soldiers fled before
they could be arrested. The Crescent’s account does not include any other details
surrounding the violent incident, including the motive behind it. Whether the editors at
the Crescent did not know the reason for the intimidation, or desired to depict it as a
senseless act, is impossible to determine.
Again and again, the Crescent returned to reports of black soldiers organizing
against local citizens, especially those who were also members of the police. Almost two
months after the riot, an article in the Crescent bore the rousing headline, “Negroes
Shooting and Cutting the Police,” depicting two stories of reckless shootings and
rebellious behavior. Shortly after midnight on September 23, a band of black soldiers,
allegedly representing the 9th United States Colored Cavalry, attacked the police at the
intersection of Conti and Treme. Despite firing several shots at the police, “none of the
shots took effect,” and the soldiers soon bolted the scene. However, they did not evade
capture. The men were arrested on Bienville Street and later charged with attempted
murder. The Crescent notes that the men were found with the “new revolvers” they had
used against the police. 56 Again, the Crescent does not provide a motive for these men’s
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actions. Instead, it depicts the affair as one in which armed black soldiers assaulted
innocent policemen at random and without reason.
The second story reported in the Crescent article also tells of irrational violence
against the police. In the early hours of a Friday morning, “a negro ball on Franklin
street, between Customhouse and Canal streets, was closed by the police for the
disorderly behavior of the people in it, the men amusing themselves by going on the
street and firing pistols.” In retaliation against the police who had shut down the ball,
Robert Mac, a black man attending the party, cut one of the officers with a razor. Mac
was soon arrested, but not before he let the police know that “he was a soldier.” 57
In September, the paper published an article titled, “Negro Riot,” a headline
reminiscent of the reports following the July 30 massacre. According to the article, the
episode began when two police officers arrested two black prostitutes near Corduroy
Alley, a “neighborhood [that] is filled with lewd negresses, and is much resorted to by
discharged negro soldiers, and blacks still in service.” The situation escalated when the
local blacks, supposedly a mob of several hundred, staged their own rescue of the two
female prisoners by heaving bricks and stones at the arresting officers. Additional forces
arrived to assist the policemen in the arrest, and “the combined forces made a
demonstration which dispersed the mob without resort to violent measures.” However,
the article claims that the mob succeeded in injuring the arresting officers, who were
“very roughly used” after the incident. The report alleges that the black men throttled and
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knocked the officers down, and “the women bit them severely, to force them to relinquish
their hold” on the prostitutes. 58
Though this riot resulted in relative peace, it reveals the concern among some
New Orleans papers that the presence of armed black men in certain neighborhoods
contributed to the outbreak of mob violence. On October 1, the Crescent published news
of a separate incident where “a large crowd of negroes were disturbing the peace, at the
corner of Barracks and Treme streets.” One member of the mob, a man named Joseph
Manuel, was arrested for having a musket in his possession and was charged with an
attempt to kill. Like other Crescent reports of riots and violent outbreaks, the article fails
to mention whether or not the arrested party was convicted. Rather, it tells a hollow, oftrepeated story of armed black men rioting on the streets of the city without an apparent
motive or cause.
The Crescent was not the only paper to publish on the condition of New Orleans
in the aftermath the riot. Newspapers located in towns across the state often reported
about affairs in the city. Many papers, like the Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times and the
Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly Gazette & Comet, insisted that the city was peaceful and that
rumors surrounding the outbreaks of violence in New Orleans were untrue, aside from a
few minor provocations that occurred among the people.
One week after the New Orleans Riot, the Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times
published a thorough account on the “State of the City and Results of the Conflict.”
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While asserting that “there has been no disturbance of public tranquility” among New
Orleanians, the account also tells of several incidents that occurred since the riot:
On Common street, on Monday evening, an infuriated negro assailed an elderly
Irish woman. She wrenched his club from him, and held him at bay until a white
man came to her assistance and prostrated him… The negroes were talking of
holding a meeting in their church on St. Paul street last evening to concert
measures for taking vengeance on the white people. The more discreet of the
colored population were advising against the meeting, and we believe it was not
held… A lot of negroes living in a house on Victory street, between Enghien and
Poet streets, shot at several citizens passing on the street…Acting Corporal
Brooks reports that four negroes, armed with revolvers, formed themselves in a
line on Claiborne street, about twelve o’clock, and prevented all white persons
from passing…Sergeant Adams reports that a squad of the eighty-first colored
infantry broke open a store on the corner of Poyfarre and Annunciations streets
and carried off with three revolvers and a shot gun. 59
Though their account indicates otherwise, the Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times stood by
their belief that “the people both white and black are setting down to a peaceful
condition.” 60
The Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times shared this conviction with other
Democratic papers, like the Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly Gazette & Comet. Echoing the
Times’ statement, the Comet reported that “the late civil commotion has been so
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thoroughly quieted down, as no longer to necessitate a continuance of absolute military
law.” 61 In his book, Louisiana Reconstructed, 1863-1877, historian Joe Gray Taylor
argues that this was a somewhat common pattern among other Louisiana papers.
Especially in the initial weeks after the riot, some Louisiana papers “preferred, if
possible, to play down the riot, even though it led to what amounted to martial law in
New Orleans.” 62 By claiming that there was peace within the city, papers like the Times
and the Comet held a certain level of authority over the Radical Republicans who had
supposedly incited the riot. In the eyes of Democratic papers, the Radicals attempt to
usurp authority was unsuccessful, and the peaceful state of the city was sure proof of their
failure.
In the days, weeks, and months following the New Orleans Riot, Louisiana papers
took several tacks to reporting on the state of the city. While some overestimated the
level of mob violence occurring on the streets, others downplayed the rumors of bedlam
and insisted that the city was at peace once more.
Rumors of Violence across the South
Aside from reporting on the condition of New Orleans after the riot, conservative
editors filled their papers with reports of mob violence occurring in other places across
the United States. None gained as much traction in the Louisiana press as the New
Orleans Riot, but each rumor of insurrection still generated provocative headlines among
the daily papers.
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In late September 1866, the New Orleans Daily Crescent published a report from
the Pensacola Observer that described a clash between Tallahassee police officers who
had attempted to arrest a black man. Following his arrest, a large crowd of blacks
attempted to wrest the prisoner from the policemen with little success. Later that evening,
the group gathered once more at the courthouse, this time armed with loaded guns and
pistols. They fired one shot before fleeing the scene. No one was seriously injured;
however, the report mentioned that a bullet passed through the skirt of a female
bystander. 63
In October, news of an insurrection made its way into the pages of the Southwestern, the New Orleans Daily Crescent, and the Opelousas Courier. The South-western
described a “serious disturbance” at Cat Island, Arkansas, located only twenty-five miles
below Memphis, a city itself fraught with intense racial violence just five months
earlier. 64 According to the dispatch, fifty blacks armed themselves to launch a mass
uprising against the local whites. A skirmish erupted when black men fired their
revolvers at two white men. In the ensuing melee, two black men were killed, and three
others were wounded. The ones supposed to incite the rebellion then scattered, and the
whites reportedly “armed themselves and went in pursuit” of the leaders of the affray. 65
The New Orleans Daily Crescent and the Opelousas Courier engaged in more
rabble-rousing versions of the affair. While the South-western deemed the events at Cat
Island a mere disturbance, the Crescent and the Courier opened with the provocative
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headline, “Negro Insurrection.” 66 The Crescent published a detailed account of the
uprising reprinted from the Memphis Avalanche. According to the Crescent, after
obtaining gunpowder, rifles, and ammunition from a local trading boat, several black men
employed at a local plantation planned an attack on the white men who lived and worked
nearby. Not only does the Crescent’s version include an account of the ensuing conflict,
it also offers an examination of the origin and motives behind the attack. The black men,
acting under direction from white men in Memphis, intended to seize the plantations and
murder those who stood in their way. The men involved were instruments of a larger
scheme, one where the black population sought to become their own rulers in society,
rather than being subject to the whims of white leaders. 67 To the Avalanche, as well as
the Crescent, the events at Cat Island signaled disastrous consequences for Southern
society. The article closed with a disconcerting question for white Southerners: “Who
could tell where it would end, had it [the riot] been successful in the beginning?” 68 By
presenting incendiary versions of the Cat Island affair, the Crescent and the Courier had
the potential to generate greater paranoia surrounding rumored outbreaks of violence in
the South.
The Courier offered a similar report as the one published in the Crescent but
added their particular partisan spin on the matter. The article stated that fifty or sixty
black men, deciding that they would no longer work on a nearby plantation, took up arms
with a pledge to kill the first white person who crossed their path. When the armed men
met the owners of the plantation at which they worked, they instigated the brutal conflict
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described in the South-western. The Courier claimed the Cat Island riot was an
unsurprising consequence of radical republican teachings, calling it, “one of the many
acts of barbarism which the poor, uneducated negro, bolstered up to think that he is the
equal of the white men, is led to do by others, when if he was in his proper position,
would never dream of committing such atrocities.” 69 The articles published in the
Courier and the Crescent serve as yet another reminder of the political motivations that
influenced which stories were modified, embellished, and put into circulation.
Conservative southern papers used these outbreaks to undercut the legitimacy of
the new political and racial order. There was scant information available to the presses
about the truths of the riot and its aftermath, but each paper molded the news that they
had acquired to reflect their partisan interests and accomplish certain goals. Regarding
this rapid circulation of fabricated stories among Southern papers after the New Orleans
Riot, Summers comments “Facts were inconvenient things.” 70 In the case of many
Democratic presses, they were seldom necessary to sell a paper.
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IV. A Radical Plot
On August 4, the New Orleans Daily Crescent published a piece titled, “The
Spirit of Our People,” describing the incendiary atmosphere in the city in the wake of the
riot. The article also reveals a common sentiment among conservative papers who
reported on the massacre. In its opening sentence, the author declared, “From indications
already made apparent, it is certain that the radicals and their backers in this city will try
to make it appear that the riots of Monday last were the outbreak of a fanatical hatred
against the negro race.” 71 To the Crescent, this was an inaccurate rendering of events.
The paper insisted that the riot was not racially motivated but began when “law-abiding
people” attempted to stop the actions of “a set of unprincipled, ambitious and vindictive
schemers, who were plotting to subvert the State authorities, and to seize possession of
the government by means which in all communities would be recognized as revolutionary
and treasonable.” 72 According to the Crescent, the riot was not a matter of escalated
racial tensions, but it was the beginning of the radicals’ elaborate plot to take over the
South.
In the weeks after the riot, conservative editors like those at the Crescent changed
the public conversation regarding the New Orleans Massacre. In their words, it was
undeniable that the radicals planned the event as part of their grand scheme to claim
control of the government. Instead of viewing the riot as a tragedy, Democratic
newspapers turned it into yet another reason to publicly condemn the insurrectionary
Radical Republicans. Historian Mark Wahlgren Summers describes this phenomenon in
his book, A Dangerous Stir: Fear, Paranoia, and the Making of Reconstruction.
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According to Summers, southern editors insisted that the radicals who incited the New
Orleans Riot had acted under the instruction of the Republicans on Capitol Hill. 73 Despite
mounting evidence to the contrary, “the allegation that Republican leaders had approved
of the convention in advance, or even ordered it, had become a staple of Democratic
reporting.” 74 Conservative papers, like the Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times, the Southwestern, and the Louisiana Democrat, among others, circulated the rumor that there was
“a Radical plot to disfranchise white ex-Confederates, enfranchise blacks, and without
taking a vote of the people in Louisiana, bring the state into the Union under its new,
bogus constitution.” 75
The Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times was a strong proponent of the radical
conspiracy in the weeks following the New Orleans Massacre. On August 4, the SemiWeekly Natchitoches Times expressed their fear that in the wake of the riot the “lately
emancipated slaves” would receive the right to vote under the leadership of the
Radicals. 76 In one article, the Times exclaimed, “From the speeches lately uttered in
public meetings, in New Orleans, it is evident that the Radical leaders are determined to
carry their intentions into effect, even if it involve the State in anarchy and blood. Let the
Conservative element of the country act in harmony, and act with vigor, in a crisis so
alarming.” 77 To the editors at the Times, it was shocking that the Radical Republicans, so
determined to obtain suffrage for African Americans, had been willing to risk innocent
lives to fulfill their grand scheme. While chaos and violence ran rampant under
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Republican influence, Louisiana’s Democrats were charged with returning peace to the
state.
In their next issue, the Times expounded upon the perceived radical plot to
overthrow the State government and denounced the Convention’s instigators. On August
8, the Times printed a lengthy account of the New Orleans riot, which included their
blatant condemnation of Radical Republican politicians and their disappointment that the
black men of the city would follow their leadership:
It seems, from the testimony of the leading colored members of the
convention, that great preparation had been made by the white leaders of
the riot, to have the negroes armed and how they should commence the
scene for bloodshed and plunder. It is strange that men who profess to be
good and honest citizens should embrace such a suicidal hallucination, as
to inaugurate a war of races to perpetuate their passionate and unpolitic
fanatical theories. It seems almost impossible that men with healthy
conscience and sound intellect should allow themselves to be carried into
the current of a Radical stream of unpopularity, and adhere to a party of
broken down politicians and disappointed and demented fanatics, who are
attempting to overthrow the government and scatter their schemes of
discord and riot in every parish of the state. 78
After blaming the Convention members for falling prey to the wiles of Radical
Republicans, the Times argued that the riot was part of a larger conspiracy, one that
sought to incite violence across the state and to take over Louisiana’s government. One
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week later, on August 15, the Times reported, “The origin of this affair must be traced to
an understanding between the Radical members of Congress, on the one hand, and on the
other, the Governor and other waifs of the Banks Government at New Orleans. In their
programme the main object was to subvert the State Government in order to inaugurate
on which would hold communion with the rump Congress...” 79 The paper also issued a
warning to its readers: “the people of this State, must be ready to witness a renewed and
perhaps more bloody attempt on the part of the anarchists to revolutionize our State
Government.” 80 The Times insisted that the New Orleans Riot was not an isolated event;
it was the beginning of a large-scale rebellion that the Radical Republicans in Congress
had furtively planned.
To the Times, the New Orleans Riot heralded a great crisis in the nation’s history.
In an August 19 article, aptly titled “The Conspiracy,” the Times claimed, “It is useless to
conceal the fact, that this very day, there is on foot within the limits of the State, a
reckless conspiracy to subvert our State and Municipal Governments – a conspiracy
which is clothed with peril, since it forms a link of the great conspiracy, by which
radicalism contemplates the overthrow of the General Government.” Just as the Times
reported in previous issues, the article insisted that the New Orleans Riot was proof that a
greater plot existed to bring the civil government under strict Republican leadership, and
they believed that radicals were working within the city “to plunge the State in another
revolution. 81

79

Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times, August 15, 1866.
Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times, August 15, 1866.
81
Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times, August 19, 1866.
80

33

In the eyes of many Louisiana newspaper editors, the New Orleans Massacre
offered yet another opportunity to express contempt of Radical Republicanism and to
intensify the growing paranoia that a larger rebellion might occur in the state. Just five
days after the riot, the Sugar Planter published their speculations on the cause of the
massacre. On August 4, its editors declared, “It is clear to every unbiased mind that this
riot was a premeditated affair on the part of the Conventionists who desired political, or
other martyrdom, that the Radical party of Congress might recover their arbitrary sway
over Louisiana.” 82 The Planter claimed with certainty that the Conventionists had
planned to provoke the violent massacre in a futile attempt to gain control of the state’s
government. Though the Planter presented this as fact, there was room for doubt in their
version of the events. As Summers demonstrated in A Dangerous Stir, many members of
the Convention arrived to the Mechanic’s Institute unarmed, and “the proposition that
delegates would show up unarmed to be slaughtered for a good Republican sensation”
was implausible. 83
In a later issue, the Planter insisted that the “radical throats of the North” were
responsible for inciting the riot. On August 11, the Planter claimed that “this riot was a
god-send to them [the radicals] – they concocted the whole scheme at home – sent their
agents South to carry it into effect – succeeded most admirably at the expense of human
life – and covered with the blood of their slaughtered friends, proclaim them martyrs in a
holy cause.” 84 The northern Republicans had engineered the riot, at the expense of the
Conventionists, to promote the cause of black suffrage and equality in the South.
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The editors at the Planter were not the only ones to purport the conspiracy that
Radicals in the North were ultimately responsible for the riot. Others papers, such as the
Louisiana Democrat, insinuated that Northern radicals had instigated the New Orleans
Massacre for their own political gain. On August 22, the Democrat published an article
with the headline, “The New Orleans Riot – The Radical Game, the Impeachment of
President Johnson.” The piece stated, “The baffled radicals have evidently resolved upon
a system of bold and desperate expedients for the instigation of mobs and riots in the
South, whereby to maintain their ascendancy among the Union war elements of the
North. Southern rebel mobs and riots against Yankees, Southern white Unionists and
negroes are the very things now most urgently required and desired by Northern radicals
for their electioneering purposes.” 85 Just like the Sugar Planter, the Democrat twisted the
story of the New Orleans Massacre into a denunciation of the Radical Republicans who
supposedly sought to use it as political fodder.
Aside from postulating that Northern Republicans had sparked the New Orleans
Massacre, the Democrat also surmised what would happen to the South if the Radicals
gained political leadership of the country. On September 26, the Democrat warned its
readers that if the Radicals won the elections, “The intense hate which the Radicals have
been treasuring up against the Southern people for the last five years, would then burst
out in all its fury…We have recently had an example of what the people of Louisiana
may expect, and our State will afford a fair specimen of the condition of the rest of her
sisters.” The Democrat insisted that if the Radicals took charge of the government,
Governor Wells and his co-conspirators would be able to accomplish what the New
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Orleans Riot had supposedly intended, which was to “adopt the Constitutional
amendment disfranchising nineteenth twentieths of the people of the State” and provide
for black enfranchisement. 86
The Shreveport South-western reported extensively on the “radical conspiracy”
and took a particular interest in criticizing Governor Wells’s role in the New Orleans
Riot. In an August 15 issue, the South-western printed the article, “Governor Wells
Defines His Position.” The piece condemned Wells for defending “the revolutionary
schemers who attempted to overturn the State government and set up in its place a
rampant radical cabal composed of fanatics and incendiaries.” 87 Not only this, the report
featured a dispatch from the New Orleans Times, another conservative paper, that
criticized the actions of Governor Wells, Convention leader R. King Cutler, and the other
radicals involved in the New Orleans Riot. According to the Times, “R. King Cutler is
anxious to disfranchise the white citizens of the state, and enfranchise the negroes. Filled
with the prejudice of party, the governor sees in the efforts of our municipal authorities to
preserve the peace only a desire to bring on a collision and redden our streets with
blood!” 88
On August 22, the South-western attempted to defend President Andrew Johnson,
who had faced political attacks from Republicans after stating that the New Orleans Riot
originated in the radical Congress. 89 In addition to defending Johnson, the South-western
published an excerpt from the Washington Intelligencer that aligns with Johnson’s view
on the radical conspiracy. The Intelligencer claimed, “It appears, conclusively, that this
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riot was, with full knowledge of the consequences, originally planned under the
supervision, and with the cognizance and connivance, if not at the instigation, of the
radical leaders in congress; that it was an open and flagrant attempt, in violation of all
law, and in defiance of an overwhelming adverse public opinion, to inaugurate a political
revolution, and a premeditated and deliberately planned effort to execute an unlawful
purpose…” 90 Despite these allegations, the official investigation into the riot later
dispelled the notion that the riot originated with Republican leaders in Congress. 91
In reporting the rumor of a grand radical plot, Democratic papers attempted to
maintain hold of political power in their communities. Desperate to defend the South’s
conservatives against northern Republican backlash in the wake of the massacre, southern
editors depicted the New Orleans Riot as part of a premeditated Radical Republican
conspiracy to subvert the state and federal governments. The conservatives, instructed to
“act with harmony, and act with vigor” in the impending revolution, stood in stark
contrast to the volatile Republicans. 92 Despite conservatives’ best efforts to accrue
political capital in favor of the Democratic Party after the riot, the New Orleans Massacre
played a crucial role in undermining Johnsonian Reconstruction and aiding the
Republican cause. 93
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V. Conclusion
In the weeks after the New Orleans Massacre, reports of insurrections and rumors
of violence persisted across Louisiana, from Shreveport to Alexandria and Opelousas.
Newspapers offered stories of mob activity, chaotic insurrections, and senseless violence,
occurring within the state and in other regions of the South. As depicted in the headlines
of Louisiana papers, the social atmosphere of the South was unstable, and the future of
the region was clouded by the fear that Radical Republicans intended to ignite a political
revolution across the South.
Though the rise of telegraphic news aided the rapid spread of information, it also
enabled the pervasive circulation of misinformation. Such misinformation, in the form of
rumors, gossip, and paranoia, contributed to the social volatility of Louisiana in the wake
of the riot. Newspapers were capable of shaping public sentiment about the New Orleans
Massacre and the reconvened constitutional convention, and readers were unable to
definitively separate fact from fiction.
In the aftermath of the New Orleans Riot, conservative newspapers spread
paranoia to maintain some semblance of authority in light of the looming threat of
Republican leadership. The conservative papers did not serve as “hidden” transcripts for
contending for power; rather, they were blatant, overt ways of distorting public
perception in order to uphold Democratic power in the face of a radicalized political
environment. The menace of Radical Republicanism appeared real to conservative
editors, and publishing elaborate radical conspiracies, distorting the number of fatalities,
and spreading rumors of instability seemed viable outlets for changing public opinion in
favor of the Democratic Party.
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Despite conservative editors’ numerous attempts, these efforts failed at increasing
Democratic popularity and provided fuel for northern Republicans, who accused southern
whites of committing countless atrocities against the black freedmen of Louisiana. The
New Orleans Massacre ultimately undermined Andrew Johnson’s Reconstruction policy,
and in 1868, the Radical Republicans gained enough political momentum to mandate
universal male suffrage as a condition for readmission to the Union. 94 When Louisiana
adopted a new constitution in April 1868, the members of the convention finally gained
what they had sacrificed their lives to achieve: the right to vote and hold office.
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